Abstract-This paper analyzes the transfer pricing of multinational firms. Intrafirm prices may systematically deviate from arm's-length prices for two motives: pricing to market and tax avoidance. Using French firm-level data on arm's-length and intrafirm export prices, we find that the sensitivity of intrafirm prices to foreign taxes is reinforced once we control for pricing-to-market determinants. Most important, we find no evidence of tax avoidance if we disregard tax haven destinations. Tax avoidance through transfer pricing is economically sizable. The bulk of this loss is driven by the exports of 450 firms to ten tax havens.
I. Introduction
A wealth of empirical evidence finds that within a multinational enterprise (MNE), reported profits vary systematically with local corporate tax rates. 1 This may be due to several types of efforts within the firm, including transfer pricing. From the perspective of the tax authorities, internal transactions between related parties should be valued at their market price: this is the arm's-length principle (see OECD, 2012, for details) . That said, as described in OECD (2010), there are numerous ways to determine the arm'slength price, including the use of comparable prices and cost-plus methods. Thus, the flexibility in these rules allows firms to choose transfer pricing methodologies that support the use of internal prices, shifting profits from high-to lowtax countries. 2 This is in addition to the potential for outright tax evasion via transfer pricing.
Direct empirical evidence of tax-induced transfer pricing, however, is scarce. Identifying such a strategy faces two major difficulties. While multinationals' exports are directly observable, detailed information on the prices of products and their modes of transaction, whether it is arm's length or intrafirm, is generally not available. Moreover, it is impossible to observe the counterfactual arm's-length prices of an intrafirm transaction (see Diewert et al., 2006, for details) . Since the arm's-length price is not observed, tax authorities have to determine the market price, which raises obvious definitional and methodological issues.
In this paper, we overcome both difficulties. We observe the export prices under each mode (arm's length or intrafirm) at the level of firms, countries, and products. Moreover, our econometric methodology allows us to compare the intrafirm price used between a multinational and its affiliate with the corresponding arm's-length price charged by a firm shipping to an unrelated party. We show that the bulk of tax avoidance comes from a few large firms through exports in a handful of industries to a relatively limited number of tax havens, where the baseline estimates find that intrafirm prices are on average 11% lower than arm's length prices. This suggests that by targeting enforcement efforts, tax authorities may be able to mitigate transfer pricing and raise tax revenues while keeping enforcement costs low. The granular dimension of tax avoidance should facilitate the implementation of global enforcement such as the one proposed by Zucman (2014) .
In order to frame our empirical analysis, we discuss the theoretical determinants of arm's-length and intrafirm prices using a highly stylized model. This simple model captures both tax-induced transfer pricing and pricing-tomarket strategies. The latter has been receiving increasing attention in the field of international trade. The model shows that were transfer pricing costless, an MNE would systematically find it optimal to deviate from the arm's-length price exporting to a country with a different corporate tax. However, the presence of a fixed component in the concealment cost generates a band of inaction. The deviation is profitable when the tax differential between the home and the host countries is sufficiently important and when the firm exports sufficiently large volumes. The wedge between the intrafirm price and the arm's-length price is a decreasing function of the host tax. We also show that arm's-length and intrafirm prices are likely to have a different sensitivity to transport costs, tariffs, and GDP per capita-variables governing pricing to market. These results suggest that one should be mindful of this difference in sensitivity in the empirical analysis. If one of these variables is significantly correlated with the level of corporate tax rates (something that is true in our data), the estimated coefficients would be biased if we were not allowing coefficients to differ across pricing modes.
On the empirical side, we rely on a unique data set that has finely grained information on the intrafirm and arm's-length quantities and prices of exported products at the firm level for almost all exporting firms in France in 1999. The richness of this data set allows us to provide a clear-cut identification of transfer pricing in the cross-section.
The case of France is particularly suited to analyzing the transfer pricing strategies of MNEs as it exempts foreign income from taxation. Compared with the United States and other countries where foreign tax credits, income baskets, and deferral complicate a firm's tax planning problem, the relatively streamlined French system provides a cleaner mapping between tax differences and firm incentives. 3 Roughly speaking, when a U.S. firm earns profits overseas, it adds up its worldwide income into a single income basket and calculates the U.S. tax owed on this amount when it repatriates these foreign earnings. The U.S. tax authorities then grant a credit against this liability that is equal to the taxes already paid to foreign governments on the firm's overseas income. If the firm has paid more taxes overseas than what is owed to the United States, it is in an excess credit position and owes no taxes to the United States. If not, it is in an excess limit case and must pay the remainder to the U.S. tax authorities. Thus, even when there are two U.S. firms with an affiliate in a tax haven, the incentive to shift profits to the tax haven depends on where else the firm pays taxes. Complicating the issue, the U.S. tax liability is not triggered until profits are repatriated or used inactively (i.e., it is no longer Subpart F income), and excess credits in a year can be carried into the future or applied retroactively, introducing a dynamic aspect to the firm's profit-shifting problem. In an exemption system such as France's, none of these considerations arise, meaning that a much simpler comparison of the French and destination tax rates describes the profit-shifting motives.
We exploit the rich structure of the data set to identify the impact of foreign taxes on the transfer pricing behavior of multinational firms. We propose a difference-in-differencelike strategy that allows us to compare the intrafirm prices charged by a particular firm for a particular product across markets with the arm's-length prices of exports for the same product exported in the same markets. Indeed in our analysis, the arm's-length price of a product is firm market specific. In addition, we include several pricing-to-market variables that the trade literature identifies as important (income, distance, and tariffs) and allow the sensitivity of free on-board prices to these variables to differ across modes. Controlling for a set of triadic fixed effects at the firm, product, and export mode levels, our strategy captures any difference between intrafirm prices and their arm's-length counterparts, which is systematically related to the corporate tax in the destination country.
In line with the main theoretical prediction, our estimates suggest that export prices drop with the destination corporate tax rate only for intrafirm transactions. This result is robust once we control for pricing to market. We then show that above a certain threshold, differences in the corporate tax rates have no effect. Transfer pricing is essentially directed to countries with very low tax rates. Interestingly, low taxes are not the entire story. Transfer pricing strategies of multinational firms systematically involve tax havens. These countries not only have low corporate tax rates but also provide an overall tax environment that facilitates profit shifting. According to the classification of Hines and Rice (1994) , in addition to a low tax rate, a tax haven must have a legal system allowing banking secrecy and a good communication infrastructure, and it must seek to promote itself as a center for financial offshoring. Thus, as the OECD's (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting strives to clarify, a tax haven is not simply a low-tax country but one that facilitates tax avoidance for firms by "artificially segregating taxable income from the activities that generate it" (p. 13). Extending our analysis, we find that profit shifting through transfer pricing is primarily done by large multinational firms. 4 A simple exercise suggests that the tax losses driven by the profit shifting of multinational firms to the ten tax havens in our sample amount to about 1% of total corporate tax revenues in France. We further show that 450 MNEs account for over 90% of intrafirm exports to these ten tax havens. Together, these imply that a large share of transfer pricing may be curbed by focusing enforcement on a small number of firms.
Although there is an extensive literature on the impact of international tax differences on the location of profits and firms, the results of which are suggestive of transfer pricing, there is little evidence of the impact of taxes on transfer prices themselves. 5 Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) use aggregated data on value-added across manufacturing sectors in the OECD. They estimate a value added function depending on corporate tax rates and other factors, finding results suggestive of profit shifting via transfer pricing. Clausing (2003) uses price indices for U.S. exports and imports that include separate indices for intra-and interfirm prices, finding a strong and significant impact of taxes consistent with transfer pricing. Using an approximation of intrafirm trade from firm-level balance sheet data, Overesch (2006) finds that the value of German MNEs' intrafirm trade varies with the difference between the German tax rate and that of the foreign parent or affiliate's location. Using firmproduct level data, Swenson (2001) finds that prices react to taxes and tariffs. Using U.S. transaction data, Neiman (2010) shows that intrafirm prices are less sticky and exhibit more pass-through than arm's-length prices. He also documents that the specific pass-through of exchange rates into intrafirm prices is not affected by the tax level in the origin country. This suggests that the dynamic of intrafirm prices is not primarily driven by the desire to shift taxable income to low-tax countries. It is worth noting that the analysis treats 122 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS tax havens and other countries with a lower corporate tax rate than the U.S. symmetrically. 6 Two recent papers, Vicard (2015) and Cristea and Nguyen (2016) , exploit the panel dimension of firm-level data on French and Danish firms, respectively. Both papers tend to provide evidence of transfer pricing. However, they do not observe intrafirm and arm's-length prices but instead assume intrafirm prices for transactions with countries where a related party is located. As Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2016) and Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2014) mentioned most firms with an affiliate in a country do not trade with this affiliate. Furthermore, a firm that exports a product to its affiliates might also well export another product to a third firm in the same country. In our sample of firm-country pairs where we observe positive intrafirm trade, the share of intrafirm trade in a firm's total trade is below 40% for onefourth of the observations. Our empirical tests rely on precise firm-level data on intrafirm and arm's-length prices.
Finally, our paper is related to the work of Bernard et al. (2006) , who examine how internal prices depend on taxes and tariffs using U.S. firm-level data. Similar to the papers already mentioned and to our own results, their estimates are consistent with transfer pricing. That said, our results contribute to the debate in a significant way by examining the granularity of transfer pricing. We do so along three dimensions. First, and most important, we consider destination tax haven status as well as tax rates. In addition to providing lowtax rates, tax havens offer MNEs a tax avoidance-friendly environment. Since we find that internal and arm's-length prices deviate most in exports to tax havens, this is critical. Second, we examine whether all MNEs use transfer pricing, finding that the intensity of profit shifting is systematically greater for larger firms. Third, we show that such transfer pricing is concentrated in differentiated products where it is difficult to compare products across firms. 7 Together, these indicate that rather than being common practice among all MNEs, transfer pricing is primarily found only among the largest firms and then mostly between the parent and its tax haven affiliates. This concentration of transfer pricing has been heretofore unrecognized in the literature.
Beyond this, there are other key differences in terms of both data and methodology. First, by using data on firms based in France rather than in the United States, we avoid the complications in taxation introduced by the U.S. foreign tax credit system. Second, the comparable market price in our study is built from the prices of firms that are not selling internally (including multinationals operating at arm's length and exporters). Bernard et al. (2006) examine the gap between the intrafirm price of a product and a benchmark arm'slength price that is charged by the same MNE. They therefore 6 Our results are robust to controlling for the growth or the volatility of bilateral exchange rates. Results are available on request.
7 Bernard et al. (2006) show that the price wedge between intrafirm and arm's-length transactions depends on the size of exporters and the differentiation of products. However, they do not study whether the sensitivity of the price wedge to corporate taxes depends on these characteristics. compare within-firm prices for a product destination, requiring the MNE to export the product both intra-and interfirm to the destination. Rather than working with price gaps, we work with prices and identify the effect of taxes using an interaction term. 8 To make inter-and intrafirm prices comparable, we control for firm-product-mode fixed effects and allow these prices to differ for pricing to market motives. Our methodology allows us to get a narrow benchmark market price while retaining more intrafirm transaction. Moreover, we avoid the complication highlighted by Cristea and Nguyen (2016) in which MNEs selling both intrafirm and at-arm's-length price at arm's length differently than non-MNEs do (potentially for tax reasons).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss the theoretical determinants of transfer pricing in order to guide the empirical analysis. In section III, we carefully present the data and the estimation sample construction. In section IV, we present the baseline estimation, extend the results, and provide a quantification exercise estimating the revenue loss for France due to transfer pricing. We conclude in section V.
II. Model
We present a simple model that illustrates how taxes and other factors, such as trade costs or GDP per capita, influence the pricing strategy of a multinational firm (MNE) and compare it to the pricing strategy of an exporter. Throughout this section, we denote with an asterisk the variables that are the outcome of firms' profit maximization.
The MNE produces a good in country H (Home) at zero cost and ships it to its affiliate located in F (Foreign) at a free-on-board price p H MNE . Both countries levy taxes on a territorial basis, where the home tax is T H and the foreign tax is T F , consistent with the tax-exemption rule for the income earned abroad by French MNEs.
For simplicity, we assume the domestic and foreign sales are separable. Exports incur trade costs that are specific to the destination market F. Specifically there is an ad valorem cost τ H MNE , such as a tariff or insurance. Finally, we assume that the production of the final good is costless. The foreign consumer price is denoted by p F MNE , and the individual demand for that good is d p
There is a unit mass of consumers in F. 9 Each of them has a willingness to pay for the first unit of the good equal to 1/β F . The parameter α is a demand shifter that is firm specific (e.g., the appeal for that firm's product). It is described by a distribution with support [0,ᾱ] . On the contrary, β F is common to all firms in destination F. For instance, β F is lower in countries with a higher GDP per capita.
To determine the transfer price set by a multinational, we use the popular concealment cost approach to modeling transfer pricing. 10 In this, the transfer price p H MNE can differ from the price p H * that would be set by an exporter with the same marginal cost (equal to 0) selling to an unaffiliated party (i.e., at arm's length). This incurs a cost
where γ F is a parameter that reflects the stringency of the fiscal regime enforcement in Foreign. This function is a tax-deductible cost that occurs in the home country. 11 This concealment cost is generally interpreted in transfer pricing models as the cost of hiring accountants to "cook the books" or the fines that the firm would pay if it were caught. We allow these costs to entail both a fixed component denoted by f and a quadratic variable cost that is a function of the price gap. 12 Note that this might vary across countries; for example, if a tax haven makes this concealment relatively easy (low γ F ), then this could reduce the total and marginal costs of concealment for a given price wedge. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the fixed component does not depend on the characteristics of F.
We use this stylized model to study the variations of the price wedge p H * p H * MNE within a market across firms and within a firm across markets with a different corporate tax T F and concealment cost parameter γ F . In order to guarantee that firms never find it optimal to set a negative intrafirm price, we assume throughout that γ F is large enough. 13
A. Pricing to Market
We start by solving the optimal price p H * set by an arm's-length exporter. The profits in Foreign are given by π
It is readily verified that the 10 This approach initiated by Kant (1988) is predominant to model transfer pricing (e.g., Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000 and Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) .
11 This assumption is made for simplicity and does not change any of the insights from the model. 12 Ernst and Young (2012) suggest that prices are one of the issues that receives "the greatest scrutiny" while volumes are not mentioned (p. 63). Of course, if a firm ever pays a penalty and adjusts its price, it will have to pay taxes accordingly, which are a function of the quantities sold. Nevertheless, our result requires only that a large price gap with small quantities be more likely to catch attention than a small price gap with large quantities. 
. As expected, the free-onboard price set by the firm depends on the characteristics of the foreign market, such as GDP per capita, tariffs, and, more generally, trade costs. The arm's-length price of a given product is therefore country specific.
B. Transfer Pricing
Under a territorial tax system, the after-tax profits of a multinational are given by
( 1) Profits are maximized by choosing the transfer price p H MNE and the price of the final good p F MNE . The maximization of equation (1) with respect to the transfer price leads to the first-order condition,
where θ
A firm finds it optimal to shift a share of its domestic profits to Foreign only if θ
. This is a standard result in the transfer pricing literature. We want to stress that multiplicative trade costs τ F v (e.g., tariffs) are also a motive for transfer pricing and that the two effects interact with each other.
Importantly, however, θ F [T F ] > 0 is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Engaging in profit shifting is costly: depending on the magnitude of the corporate tax gap between its home and destination countries, a firm may not find it profitable to do so. Furthermore, even when the conditions are favorable (low T F , low γ F ), all firms need not engage in profit shifting, as we shall see. Considering the second first-order condition of an MNE with respect to p F MNE yields the following equation:
Plugging equation (2) into the above equation and rearranging the expression leads to the optimal price wedge:
Since θ
is decreasing in T F , taking the first partial derivative of equation (3) 
C. Firm Heterogeneity and the Inaction Band
For equation (2) to hold, however, it must be the case that firms actually choose to engage in profit-shifting activities. Now, since shifting profits through transfer pricing involves a fixed cost, only a subset of firms finds it profitable to do so. Formally we have
as soon as α > 0, so there is a unique cutoff such that π
. This cutoff is destination specific and higher when the foreign corporate tax rate is higher (see the online appendix for details). It delimits an inaction band: there is no profit shifting toward destinations with a high cutoff (formallyα F >ᾱ), such as destinations with a small corporate tax differential. To sum up:
Proposition 1. The deviation of intrafirm prices from arm's-length prices is larger in destinations with a lower corporate tax rate. When a fixed cost must be incurred to engage in profit shifting, there is an inaction band: multinational firms choose arm's-length pricing when the corporate tax differential (or tariff) with the destination country is small.
Importantly, even in this simple model, the marginal impact of T F and γ F on the price wedge varies across destinations. Expression (3) implies also that a higher GDP per capita (i.e., a lower β F ) has a positive impact on the price wedge. In other words, the sensitivity of arm's-length and intrafirm prices with respect to trade costs and GDP per capita generally differs. Failure to account for this can potentially result in misleading estimates of the impact of taxes on the difference between intra-and interfirm prices. Now, considering a destination such thatᾱ >α F , all firms with a type above the threshold set their price below the arm's-length price according to equation (3). Thus, conditional on profit shifting, firms facing a higher demand curve abroad (high α) exhibit larger deviations from the arm'slength price. Since equation (2) implies a positive correlation relation between the volume exported to a destination by a multinational and the price wedge, we can conclude that firms with a higher α also export higher volumes.
Proposition 2. In a given destination, larger intrafirm trade flows come with larger deviations of intrafirm prices with respect to arm's-length prices.
Thus, the deviation from the arm's-length price is increasing in firm size, presuming that, consistent with the data, larger firms export more. This exercise yields a set of predictions for us to take to the data. First, a lower destination tax rate should lower the intrafirm price but should not have any effect on arm's-length prices. Second, for a given corporate tax rate in the destination country, a lower concealment cost should be associated with lower intrafirm prices. In other words, we expect profit shifting via transfer pricing toward tax havens. Third, the price wedge is a function of destination-specific income and trade costs, so there should be differences in the impact of these market-specific characteristics (transport costs, tariffs, and GDP per capita) on arm's-length prices and transfer prices. Fourth, the price wedge should be larger for larger firms.
III. Data and Identification Strategy

A. Data Description
To investigate the factors driving transfer pricing, we use detailed cross-sectional information on intrafirm and arm'slength export prices for a set of French firms in 1999. France issued its first tax rule with respect to transfer pricing documentation requirements in 1996. 14 What is more, 1999 is the last year before which advanced pricing agreements (APAs) started to be granted by French tax authorities. Such an agreement allows a multinational firm to negotiate an understanding with one or more tax authorities that approves a transfer pricing methodology for a given period, resolving the uncertainty about its acceptability and reducing audit risk. 15 These agreements do not, however, concern the firms in our sample as the French tax authorities did not grant any APAs in 1999. In other words, the year 1999 is ideal to identify transfer pricing practices.
In order to construct our estimation sample, using a unique firm identifier, we combined three data sets that have detailed information on the firm-level export values and quantities of eight-digit product categories by destination, and data on MNE status. These data sets also provide information on whether a transaction is intrafirm or arm's length. We merge these data sets with information on country-level characteristics such as the level of the corporate tax rate, distance, tariffs, and per capita income.
Firm-level data. Our first data set comes from French Customs, which reports the yearly free-on-board values and quantities of exports by firm, eight-digit CN product category, and destination. The data set is quasi-exhaustive as a declaration threshold of 1,000 euros for annual exports applies to any given destination. Extra-European shipments under 1,000 euros are subject to a simplified declaration procedure and do not appear in our data. Within the single European market, firms are not required to submit the regular 14 Article 57 of the French tax code contains the main French legal provisions on transfer pricing. It states that in assessing the income tax owed by French taxable entities that are controlled by or control entities outside France, any profits indirectly transferred to the latter, whether by an increase or decrease in purchase or sales prices or by any other means, shall be added back to the taxable income.customs form. The reporting threshold is based on each firm's cumulated yearly export value (all destinations within the EU). The declaration threshold for European countries' export flows is higher, at around 150,000 euros in 1999. We use the value and the quantity of firms' exports of a given product (CN8) to a given destination in order to construct the destination-and firm-specific free-on-board unit values, our proxy for the price a firm charges for that product in a given market.
This data set, however, does not provide information on the export mode, that is, whether a transaction is intrafirm or arm's length. We obtain this information from a confidential INSEE firm-level survey on the foreign activities of French multinational firms. For budget reasons, the survey was taken only in 1999 for all French firms with trade worth more than 1 million euros. 16 In the survey, a firm is part of or is itself a group that controls at least 50% of the voting rights of a firm outside France. Hence, all the firms have at least one related party abroad and can be considered MNEs. A French intragroup transaction is thus defined as trade with a directly or indirectly affiliated related party controlled by the group. Intrafirm trade does not include trade with firms that share a licensing agreement or other nonownership arm'slength arrangement. The INSEE survey provides a detailed geographical breakdown of French MNEs' export values and quantities at the product level (HS4) and of their exporting modes through outside suppliers or related parties. The database does not have information on the foreign affiliates. We then merge the Customs data with the INSEE survey. This is a straightforward process because firms are identified by the same ID number in the two data sets, and there is a direct mapping between French CN8 product categories and HS4 product categories. 17 We use information from LIFI, a French firm-level data set on financial linkages between firms. This is used to determine whether a firm in the French Customs data is an MNE and, if so, its nationality and the country locations of its related parties. LIFI is also interesting because it provides the countries where the parents of affiliates located in France are located themselves. As this identifies some firms in the French Customs data as MNEs for which we do not have the INSEE data, we drop these 606 firms because we cannot know whether their transactions are intrafirm or arm's length (2.8% of the value of French exports). We also eliminate the observations of state-owned firms as these firms might have a different price-setting mechanism (2.5% of French exports).
The data allow us to tag trade flows as intrafirm or arm's length. In our data, 1.6% of the firms do both intrafirm and arm's-length export within an HS4-destination category. 16 The 1 million threshold reduces the number of respondents, but the survey still covers 96% of French international trade (imports and exports). While 8,239 firms were surveyed, only 53% of them responded. However, they cover 84% of French total exports (Bovar, Lebon, & Plateau, 2003, table 1) . 17 We drop 6,417 observations (2% of exports) for which the value of exports reported in the Customs data is 1% higher or 1% lower than the value of exports reported in the survey.
When the INSEE survey indicates that an HS4 category has a share of intrafirm exports exceeding 99%, we classify all corresponding CN8 exports by MNEs as intrafirm transactions. If the share is less than 1%, we classify the CN8 codes as arm's length. When the share is positive but below 99% and above 1%, we drop the observations for this firm for this destination-HS4 dyad, as we cannot assess whether the corresponding CN8 transactions are intrafirm or arm's length. We drop 3% of observations accounting for roughly 11.5% of the total value of French exports because of this. 18 Therefore, the identification of transfer pricing does not rely on the comparison between intrafirm and arm's-length prices charged by the same firm within a destination.
Furthermore, in some destinations, we observe only the intrafirm prices of a product. Our strategy relies on the comparison of arm's-length and intrafirm prices; we thus have to exclude these product-destination pairs. Out of 208,904 product-destination pairs, we drop 6,302 pairs for which we observe only intrafirm trade prices. They account for 1.2% of French exports and 4.8% of intrafirm exports. 19 This then leaves us with information at the firm, CN8 product, country, and exporting-mode level. Once merged with country characteristics, there are 729,737 observations in our unbalanced baseline sample. 20 Our cross-section is composed of 64,633 firms, 5,457 products, and 45 countries. About 9.2% of the total number of observations are intrafirm prices.
It is worth emphasizing that most of the prices set by MNEs are not intrafirm prices. In this sample, only 15.7% of the prices set by MNEs are intrafirm prices, accounting for 56.5% of their exports. Another interesting fact is that in our data, one-third of multinational firms do not report intrafirm trade in countries where they have affiliates (or headquarters) according to LIFI. A last fact pertains to the likelihood that we observe both arm's-length and intrafirm trade for a multinational firm exporting to a given country. To study this point, we restrict the sample of firm-destination pairs to those that feature intrafirm exports. Since firms make part of their exports to these countries intrafirm, we can be certain that the firm has a related party in the destination country. Among these pairs, there are firms selling all their exports intrafirm, while other firms may export to the country through both modes. In the data, the median share of intrafirm trade is 98%. This means that conditional on exporting intrafirm to 18 We use alternative definitions of the thresholds. As shown in tables A.10 to A.12 of the online appendix, they do not affect the main results of the paper.
19 The probability that we observe only intrafirm transactions is negatively associated with the tax rate of the destination country. The selection effect tends to underestimate the effect of taxes on intrafirm prices. We also drop all the product-destination pairs where there is no intrafirm transaction (these pairs account for about half of French exports). 20 We lose information on about 10% of the French export value when merging the data set with the tax rate data. We also lose an additional 2.3% of the export value when merging the data with information on tariffs. The tariff data are not available for 20 countries in the original sample of 65 countries. Reproducing the estimations without the tariff variable leads to qualitatively similar results.
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a country, the median firms export almost entirely intrafirm. This figure, however, hides large variations. In particular, we find that for one-fourth of product-country pairs, the share of intrafirm trade is at most 40%. To put it differently, even if a firm exports intrafirm to a country, in 25% of cases, the share of intrafirm exports to the country is below 40%. These facts confirm the usefulness of having information on intrafirm and arm's-length transactions. They also show the caveats of databases that report information only on the presence of related parties in the destination country.
Tax and tax haven data. In our model, equilibrium is where the marginal savings from reducing tariff and tax payments equal the marginal cost of transfer pricing. Thus, the most appropriate tax measure is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on income as this represents the tax savings from shifting 1 euro of income. If taxes are flat, the EMTR equals the effective average tax rate (EATR). However, if taxes are progressive (as is typically the case), the EATR will understate the tax savings from transfer pricing. In our baseline results, we use the EMTR from Loretz (2008) . In robustness checks, we use the EATR and the top statutory corporate tax rate instead (both from Loretz, 2008) and find qualitatively identical results. In the baseline estimation, we used the EMTR reported in 1998 or 1997 (whichever was closer) when the data for 1999 were missing. 21 An important aspect of these tax rate measures is that they are constructed from statutory tax policies, but unlike the headline tax rate, they account for factors such as the tax offsets from capital expenditures for a hypothetical firm (see Loretz, 2008 , for details). As such, EMTR and EATR are exogenous to firm decisions, something that would not be the case if we used firm accounting data to construct firm-specific taxes.
As seen in table A1 in the table appendix, the effective average and marginal tax rates vary considerably across countries. In our estimation sample, the EMTR ranges from 0% in the Bahamas to about 46% in the Russian Federation. Of great concern in policy circles is the use of investment in tax havens for aggressive tax planning. This is particularly true for countries such as France and Germany that exempt foreign income from taxation. 22 We therefore use additional information on tax havens. Our definition follows the one in Hines and Rice (1994) , which has been used recently by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) . This gives us ten tax havens in our estimation sample: the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Singapore, and Switzerland. 23 Approximately 41% of 21 Notice that the 38 of 49 countries in our sample share a bilateral tax treaty with France. Controlling for the existence of treaties (and interacting with the intrafirm dummy) does not change the results, and indeed, we find little impact of tax treaties on transfer pricing.
22 See Gumpert et al. (2011) , who consider this issue for a large sample of German MNEs. 23 The correlation between tax haven status and EMTR is −0.54 and is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level of significance. The correlation between the tax haven dummy variable and the explanatory variable log(1− EMTR) is 0.51. firms export to these countries, and these exports account for roughly 11% of the total number of observations. 24 As Hines and Rice discussed in (1994) , this classification begins with a list provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (see Glautier & Bassinger, 1987) , which they modify by requiring four attributes of a tax haven: a low tax rate, legislation enabling business and banking secrecy, a good communication infrastructure, and self-promotion as an offshore financial center. It is important to recognize that their definition requires all of these and relies on both a low tax rate and features that would aid a firm in undertaking transfer pricing (which can be interpreted as reflecting a lower cost of transfer pricing in our model). As such, some countries appearing on the IRS list (and in our data) are excluded from tax haven status. Specifically, Austria (which, although it satisfies the latter three, has a relatively high tax rate), Korea, Argentina, and Ecuador (three low-tax countries that do not claim to be offshore financial centers and are not generally regarded as tax havens) are not classified as such. By contrast, Malta is added since, although Loretz (2008) lists it as having a fairly high tax rate, given the low taxes paid by U.S. firms, Hines and Rice (1994) include it. Other lists use similar notions to identify tax havens, although the specifics differ. For example, the OECD's (2000) list requires a comparable lack of transparency and practices that promote secrecy but tightens the tax rate criterion to "no or only nominal taxes." Thus, whereas the approach of Hines and Rice (1994) identifies Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland as tax havens, the OECD's does not. 25 Other lists, such as those compiled by the Financial Stability Board (2000) or Tax Justice Network (2007) do include these three countries.
Pricing-to-market data. Firms adjust their prices to the characteristics of the destination market. The empirical literature has identified two main regularities in firms' pricing-to-market behavior: firms charge higher prices when the destination is farther away and when the destination is wealthier (Bastos & Silva, 2010; Manova & Zhang, 2012; Martin, 2012) . Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) have shown that small and large firms may react differently to trade costs depending on their size and productivity. In our model, we show that these factors may affect intrafirm prices differently from arm's-length prices. Furthermore, as these market characteristics are correlated to the level of the corporate tax rate, it is crucial to control for them. We therefore use data on per capita GDP (in logarithms) from the Internal Financial Statistics of the IMF to control for the level of country-specific income. As measures of trade costs, we use the logarithm of the bilateral distance variable (the population-weighted average distance between countries' main cities in kilometers), which is taken from the CEPII database (Mayer & Zignago, 2006) , and information from TRAINS on tariffs faced by French exporters, which is developed by the WITS (UNCTAD). 26 In our data, distance and per capita GDP are both significantly and negatively correlated with both the effective tax rates and tax haven status, suggesting that their omission could bias our results. In the online appendix, we extend the baseline results to other factors that might also be relevant (see table A.3). For example, luxury-goods exporters are likely to take into consideration the amount of inequality in a country in setting prices. Manova and Zhang (2012) find, moreover, that country size matters, as does remoteness. Controlling for these additional factors does not alter our main results.
B. Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of intrafirm prices charged by MNEs with arm's-length prices for a given product across countries. It is important to note that this arm's-length comparison includes pure exporters, MNEs without affiliates in a given destination, and those with affiliates in this destination that nevertheless sell the product only to nonaffiliates. Before detailing our strategy, we clarify the following points. First, we do not identify transfer pricing by comparing intrafirm and arm's-length prices charged by a given firm in a single destination for a particular product. A significant price wedge between internal and arm's-length prices within firm-HS4-destination may serve to alert tax auditors to tax-induced transfer pricing. As Cristea and Nguyen (2016) pointed out, MNEs tend to manipulate their arm's-length prices as well as their internal prices. Thus, comparing the arm's-length and intrafirm prices charged by the same MNE would not allow us to cleanly identify the extent of transfer pricing. Second, as detailed below, our strategy requires information on firms that are exporting. While we can identify exporters located in France, we cannot identify the firms exporting their product to France. Any comparison between intrafirm and armlength import prices might therefore be driven by foreign exporters' attributes such as their productivity that are not related to transfer pricing strategies. For that reason, our analysis focuses on export prices.
In our empirical estimation, we make use of an interaction term between the tax variables and an indicator of the exporting mode that is equal to 1 if the transaction is intrafirm and 0 if it is arm's length. This interaction term allows us to compare the arm's-length and intrafirm prices of MNEs and exporters for a given product. Moreover, our empirical model includes a set of triadic fixed effects at the firm, product, and export mode levels. The use of triadic fixed effects accounts for a broad set of attributes of the transactions at the firm, product, and exporting mode levels that might also account for the levels of the price differential (Bernard et al., 2006) . More importantly, the use of triadic fixed effects along with the interaction term allows us to compare the export prices for different modes (arm's length and intrafirm) for a given product across countries. Given the set of controls that we discuss below, the estimated interaction coefficients give an indication of the price differential due to transfer pricing.
Our identification strategy implies that the deviation from the arm's-length price in itself is not evidence of transfer pricing; rather it is the systematic and significant relationship between this deviation and the tax differential across countries that is indicative of transfer pricing. As we will show, we use destination fixed effects in some specifications to control for destination-specific heterogeneity. Given p fpmc , the export price charged by firm f for product p in country c under the export mode m, the empirical strategy involves estimating the following model:
Tax captures the tax level in the destination country. Our primary measure is defined as Tax c = log(1−τ c ), with τ c being the EMTR in country c. 27 Our second measure, TaxHaven c , is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is on the tax haven list of Hines and Rice (1994) . These are both also interacted with Intra fpmc , a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the export mode is intrafirm and 0 otherwise. Since we expect the price wedge to be increasing in the amount of profits retained by the firm-Tax c = log(1 − τ c ) is larger or the country is a tax haven-we anticipate both of these interactions to be negative (i.e., a larger absolute value difference between the intrafirm and arm's-length prices). The term μ fpm is a comprehensive set of firm-productmode fixed effects. X c is a vector of country-specific variables that includes the logarithm of distance, tariffs, and the logarithm of GDP per capita. We interact these variables with the intrafirm transaction dummy, as the pricing behavior of firms is also affected by bilateral trade costs and income in the destination market and might also vary across export modes. Since prices might also be influenced by the market structure and the intensity of competition in the foreign market and since these characteristics are unobservable, we introduce a set of country fixed effects in some specifications. Finally, fpmc is the disturbance term. The standard errors are allowed to be adjusted for clustering at the country level to account for heteroskedasticity and nonindependence across repeated observations within countries. 28 Table 1 gives the 27 Alternatively, we use the EATR measure and find comparable results (see tables A.7 and A.8 in the online appendix).
28 Clustering at the product or product-mode level leads to smaller standard errors than when we cluster at the country level. The results are shown in the online appendix's table A.6. As Cameron and Miller (2015) showed, the use of bigger and more aggregate clusters as the country level in our case is the most conservative cluster dimension and should avoid bias. summary statistics of the main explanatory variables. The distribution of intrafirm and arm's-length prices is reported in figure A .2 in the online appendix.
IV. Results
A. Baseline Results
According to the theoretical predictions, the average internal price should be lower than the arm's-length price in a country with a lower marginal effective tax rate. The estimates are reported in table 2. Overall, the specifications explain about 87% of the variation of the log level of export prices as suggested by the adjusted R 2 . The estimates using the EATR variable are reported in tables A.7 and A.8 in the online appendix. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered in the country dimension.
In column 1, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the effective marginal tax rate on the level of arm'slength prices. We do, however, find a negative and significant interaction coefficient between the corporate tax and the intrafirm dummy: internal export prices are relatively lower than arm's-length prices in destinations with a lower corporate tax rate. A 10% decrease in the effective marginal tax rate leads to a reduction of intrafirm prices by 1.2% (2.1% using the EATR variable).
In column 2, we control for other country characteristics that might influence a firm's pricing behavior. Nevertheless, we continue to find comparable results: that taxes influence internal prices but not those between unrelated parties. If anything, the estimated impact is slightly larger, suggesting a slight bias when they are excluded. In line with the prediction of our model, we find a positive impact of per capita GDP on the level of prices. A 10% increase in per capita GDP raises the export prices by 0.6%. However, we find a negative and statistically significant interaction coefficient between the per capita GDP and the intrafirm mode variables. This suggests a slightly lower impact of per capita GDP on internal prices. Although a firm has an incentive to mark up prices over costs when selling to unrelated parties in order to extract rents, this incentive is not present when selling to itself. As such, if internal trade includes a larger share of intermediate goods that are not directly sold to overseas customers, this result makes sense. Turning to the trade cost variables, we find a positive effect of distance on export prices in line with the literature. A 10% increase in distance raises export prices by 0.8%. As an example, given the distances between France and the countries in our sample, the export prices are on average 0.8% higher in the Netherlands as compared to Belgium. The effect of distance on internal export prices is lower, which is also consistent with smaller markups for internal trade. Concerning the tariff variable, the effect on arm's-length prices is not significant. In other words, there is no evidence of dumping by French arm'slength exporters. This might be due to the low cross-country variation in the tariff variable, as 90% of observations concern a transaction toward countries that are members of the European Union. However, intrafirm prices are significantly lower than arm's-length prices in high-tariff countries, suggesting that firms choose to undervalue their exports to pay lower tariffs.
In column 3, we replace our EMTR variable with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the destination is a tax haven. As tax havens not only have low taxes but often provide other mechanisms that facilitate profit shifting (such as the limited exchange of information between tax authorities), one might expect that internal prices differ markedly in these nations. The results are striking. The coefficient of the interaction between the tax haven dummy variable and the intrafirm export mode is highly significant. We do not find a significant effect of the tax haven dummy variable on the arm's-length price. This result suggests that arm's-length export prices are the same regardless of whether the destination is a tax haven. The interaction between the tax haven and the export mode dummy variables is significantly negative, indicating that the average internal export price for a tax haven is about 11% lower than the comparable arm's-length price. This suggests that tax havens are playing a major role in the transfer pricing strategies of firms. 29 This finding remains robust in column 4 when we reintroduce the effective marginal tax rate and its interaction term with the export mode, where we find the intrafirm export prices to be about 9% lower than arm's-length prices in tax haven destinations even when tax rates do not differ. Notice that the coefficient of the interaction term that involves the EMTR is smaller and loses statistical significance once we control for tax havens. As tax havens tend to have low taxes, 29 Notice that the coefficient on the tax haven dummy is high (0.11) but not significant. While the coefficient of the tax haven dummy does not change the interpretation of our results, it suggests higher arm's-length prices in tax havens. A careful examination of the data shows that the magnitude of this particular coefficient is entirely driven by the high prices charged by arm's-length exporters in Switzerland. Including a dummy for Switzerland pushes the coefficient on the tax haven dummy to 0-but the interaction with the intrafirm dummy variable remains stable. Our main results are robust, and the coefficient on tax haven is 0.2 when Switzerland is excluded. This table investigates the impact of the effective tax rate, GDP per capita, distance, tariffs, and of the tax haven dummy on intra-firm and arm's length export prices. In column 6, we further include country fixed effects. In column 5, we drop tax haven destinations. Robust standard errors clustered by destination in parentheses. Significance levels:
* p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01.
this suggests that the results in column 2 were biased due to a failure to control for the tax haven status. Further, it highlights the important difference between having low taxes and having low taxes together with other policies that make tax planning easier. Indeed, the OECD (2013) makes precisely such a distinction. 30 In column 5, we investigate the importance of tax havens further by excluding them from the analysis. Compared to column 2, the coefficient of the interaction term that involves the effective tax rate is about three times lower and becomes insignificant, again suggesting that the impact in column 2 comes from tax havens.
Finally, column 6 includes a set of destination-specific dummy variables. Introducing country fixed effects does not allow us to estimate the direct effect of the countryspecific variables (including the tax rate and tax haven status). This, however, comes with the benefit of controlling for other destination characteristics. As can be seen, the tax rate interaction remains insignificant, and the tax haven interaction is virtually unchanged in magnitude and becomes even more significant. Thus, even after including destination fixed effects, we find evidence of taxinduced transfer pricing, which is most evident in tax haven countries. 30 The firms might also operate in tax havens and nontax haven countries. We also drop the firms that export to tax havens internally. We do not find a significant tax effect. This suggests that there is no substitution effect. The transfer pricing strategy is not used by firms that do not export to tax havens, while firms that export to tax havens have lower prices in countries with lower tax rates.
B. Transfer Pricing in Low-Tax Jurisdictions
Until now, we have investigated the average effect of tax rates on the export price differential. We find evidence of transfer pricing, but only in tax haven countries characterized by very low tax rates. Our results therefore suggest a threshold effect of the tax rates on the price differential. We examine this effect further by running a regression using, instead of the EMTR, a set of dummy variables indicating the decile in which a country's EMTR falls. We choose the ninth decile as our benchmark. This decile is composed of five countries that have roughly the same effective marginal tax rate as France and where, in theory, internal and arm'slength prices should be the same. The first decile includes countries with the lowest effective marginal corporate tax rates: the Bahamas, Hong Kong, Ireland, Slovenia, and South Africa. The tenth decile includes Argentina, Germany, Japan, and Poland, the countries with the highest effective marginal corporate tax rates in our sample.
The estimated coefficients of these interaction terms are shown in figure 1. We report the median tax rate in each decile and show that the results are not driven by important jumps in EMTRs between deciles. The pattern described in figure 1 is consistent with the presence of an inaction band driven by the fixed component of the concealment costs as shown by the theory. Each dot corresponds to the interaction coefficient between the effective average tax rate and the intrafirm export mode dummy variable. We also display the confidence intervals at the 5% level. The estimated effects are quite heterogeneous. The point estimate of the interaction 130 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS This graph displays the price wedge between intrafirm and arm's-length prices by decile of the destination country corporate tax rate. The price wedge is measured by the coefficients on the interaction between tax deciles and an intrafirm dummy in a regression of the logarithm of export prices on firm-productexporting mode fixed effects, tax decile of the destination country, GDP per capita, distance, and tariff, and their interaction with a dummy equal to 1 if the exports are between related parties. Each dot reports the coefficient associated with the interaction between the intrafirm dummy and a dummy for the tax decile of the destination country. The first decile is the decile of countries with the lowest corporate tax rates. The tenth decile is the decile with the highest corporate tax rates. The coefficient for the decile 9 is normalized to 0 (countries with the same tax level as France). The x-axis reports the median tax rate within each tax decile. The gray area corresponds to the confidence interval at 5%. effect is, however, negative and significant only for countries in the first two deciles. This indicates that our results are heavily driven by the nine lowest-tax countries, five of which are also classified as tax havens (see table 5 ). As explained in section 2, our simple model can easily accommodate such inaction band when the concealment cost function includes a fixed cost.
C. Additional Results
A relevant concern that has been raised in the literature studying the effects of transfer pricing is the differing abilities of firms to engage in transfer pricing (Bernard et al. 2006 ). In our model, larger firms are expected to have larger price differentials. In columns 1 and 2 of table 3, we split the sample according to the size of the MNEs measured by their total exports. 31 In the first column, we drop MNEs below the 75th percentile of the distribution of multinational firms' size and thus keep large MNEs and all pure exporters. 32 In column 2, we drop observations of MNEs above the 25th percentile, keeping only small MNEs and all pure exporters. Looking at the corporate tax and the tax haven interactions with the intrafirm trade dummy, we find significance for tax havens only for the large firms, which is consistent with the inaction band emphasized in the model. This indicates that 31 Note that as all the estimations in table 3 include destination fixed effects, only the interaction terms can be estimated. 32 Note that since all exporters appear in both columns 1 and 2, the combined number of observations across these two regressions is greater than in the baseline specification. the manipulation of internal prices for tax reasons is primarily a phenomenon for large firms in tax havens. Further, we find that the relationship between pricing to market and internal prices is more prevalent in large firms.
In columns 3 and 4, we analyze another source of heterogeneity by operating a distinction across the nationality of ownership of an MNE. In column 3, we include MNEs that are French residents or are majority owned by a French group (as well as all non-MNEs). In column 4, we include MNEs that are majority owned by a foreign group and all exporters. Comparing the two, we find that the coefficients are estimated more precisely in the sample of French firms. In particular, we find significance for tax havens only for the French firms. These results therefore again suggest that tax havens play a major role in the transfer pricing strategies of French firms.
In column 4, although the sign of the tax rate and tax haven variables match those in the French-only sample, they are not statistically significant. This suggests that similar forces are at play for this sample as well, although there may be greater noise due to the variety of parent countries in this sample as compared to that in column 3. In particular, if MNEs from other countries face worldwide taxation, this may illustrate the cleaner tax effects to be found by using data on FDI from a tax-exempting country.
In France, as in most other countries, the tax authorities' expectation is that firms set the price of their internal transactions according to the arm's-length principle. 33 The main force at play in the above model is that deviations from this price come at a cost. This cost includes penalties incurred if a firm is caught. When the appropriate arm's-length price is easily determined, as is the case for homogeneous goods that are traded in organized markets, transfer pricing should therefore be minimal. By contrast, differentiated products that are by definition specific to the relationship lack such comparable arm's-length transactions (Blonigen, Oldensk, & Sly, 2014) . Thus, MNEs that export differentiated products might more easily reduce taxes via transfer pricing. In columns 5 and 6, we use the Rauch (1999) classification and document the effect of taxes and tax havens on both the homogeneous and the differentiated goods category. 34 There is no difference between intra-and interfirm transactions for goods that are exchanged on organized markets (i.e. where appropriate prices are easily verified by tax authorities). Differentiated products, however, do show evidence of such pricing practices. Notice that the estimated coefficients reported in column 6 are in line with the ones found in the baseline estimation (column 6 of table 2). 33 The French tax legislation is based on the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP). This means applying prices that independent companies would set in identical transactions (BOI, 1999) . 34 In the online appendix's table A.9, we go beyond the binary product classification that Rauch (1999) proposed by using alternative measures of differentiation that Khandelwal (2010) or Nunn (2007) proposed. The estimated coefficients are less precise but suggest that transfer pricing strategies are more pronounced in industries that exhibit more vertical differentiation or require relationship-specific inputs. This table investigates the impact of the effective tax rate, GDP per capita, distance, tariffs, and the tax haven dummy on intrafirm and arm's-length export prices. Column 1 focuses on MNEs whose export sales are above the P75. Column 2 focuses on MNEs whose export sales are below the P25. Column 3 excludes foreign-owned affiliates. Column 4 excludes French MNEs. Column 5 contains only products classified as homogeneous in the Rauch nomenclature. Column 6 contains only products classified as differentiated in the Rauch nomenclature. Column 7 excludes MNEs whose main activity abroad is wholesale. Robust standard errors clustered by destination reported in parentheses. Significance levels:
In column 7, we show that our baseline results are robust to the exclusion of the observations of firms active in the wholesale sector, as the pricing behavior of such firms may differ from that of others. As can be seen, the results are robust to their exclusion.
In the last column of table 3, we deal with the selfselection of firms into the multinational status. As Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) emphasized, the selection of firms into multinationals depends on a set of firm characteristics and on barriers to entry and other destination market characteristics such as the level of competition. These characteristics may well be influenced by the corporate tax rate or the tax haven status of the destination market. Our specification allows for the possibility that market characteristics vary across industries and across countries. We include country × HS2-industry fixed effects in column 8 and show that our main results hold.
One may worry that the specific behavior of transfer pricing to tax havens is due to the very specific nature of transactions between firms and their affiliates in these jurisdictions. In the online appendix, we show that the nature of intrafirm transactions to tax havens is very similar to intrafirm exports toward other destinations (see table A.3). Specifically, about 70% of intrafirm exports are resold directly by the affiliates, while about 30% of intrafirm exports are used by the affiliates in their production process. 35 We also examine whether the volumes exported by firms are systematically different between tax havens and other countries. We use the same empirical strategy as the one that we implemented for the analysis of export prices. The estimation of quantities at the level of firm-product 35 Note that we have information only on the use of the products by the affiliates for 45% of intrafirm transactions, accounting for 77% of intrafirm exports.
and destination requires us to augment the former specifications by the size of the destination market. We therefore include the destination market GDP as larger destination markets import more volumes. The results are reported in table A2 in the table appendix. In columns 1 and 2, we restrict the sample to the intrafirm trade flows only. In columns 3 and 4, we report the results based on estimations using the full sample. In either sample, we do not find any quantity differential between arm's-length and intrafirm exports in tax havens. These findings suggest that low intrafirm prices in tax havens are not directly related to the exported quantities.
In the online appendix, we provide a set of additional robustness checks. Our results are robust to additional determinants of pricing to market (table A. 3), alternative definitions of the variables of interest (tax rates, tariffs, and product differentiation; tables A.5, A.7/A.8, and A.9), different thresholds' definitions of the export mode (tables A.10-A.12), and alternative treatments of the intrafirm trade variable (table A.13).
D. Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation
To quantify the losses for tax authorities due to transfer pricing, we use the estimates of the baseline estimation, column 4. In our quantification exercise, we compute the loss of exports due to lower pricing in tax havens. In 1999, the French effective corporate tax rate was 31.8%, and brought in about 36 billion euros of corporate tax receipts. 36 In column 3 of table 2, we find that intrafirm prices are 10.4% (exp(−0.11) − 1) lower than the market price in tax 132 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS havens. 37 Table 4 reports the share of exports and the share of these exports that were intrafirm for the ten tax havens. Three of these countries are important export destinations. Furthermore, the shares of intrafirm exports to Switzerland or Ireland are very high (around 60%). One can see strong heterogeneity in the importance of the different tax havens. Conduit tax havens like Switzerland, Ireland, Singapore, and Hong Kong account for the lion's share of profit shifting. By contrast, profit shifting through the transfer pricing of physical products is very modest for financial tax havens like the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Recognizing this distinction between types of tax havens can improve the effectiveness of tax enforcement. Using the intrafirm trade values in the data, the final column gives the value of underpriced intrafirm exports, the sum of which amounts to more than 1 billion euros. 38 Without this underreporting, French tax authorities would have collected 333 million euros more. This figure can be compared to the 36 billion euros collected in 1999 (which includes both services and manufacturing), meaning that total tax revenues that year would have been roughly 1% greater were it not for transfer pricing by manufacturing firms in these ten tax havens. Interestingly, only 2,495 firms make intrafirm exports to these countries, with a scant 450 firms accounting for 90% of intrafirm exports to these ten countries. What is more, almost 50% of intrafirm exports to these tax haven 37 We consider all intrafirm exports, not only those used in our estimates. Note that using the information on the location of foreign affiliate would overestimate the losses for the tax authorities due to transfer pricing as some multinationals do not export internally to these locations. 38 These are estimated figures. We report confidence intervals for these figures computed from the standard errors of the coefficients obtained with clustering in either the country or the product dimension. destinations come from 25 firms. This suggests that a small number of firms are avoiding a large tax payment. 39 Our results suggest that the lion's share of transfer pricing practiced in France is concentrated in the exports to at most ten countries by about 7% of multinationals. Targeting exports by these firms to tax havens would make enforcement of the arm's-length price principle more efficient.
V. Conclusion
Despite the clear incentive that firms have to shift profits through transfer pricing and the widespread concern over its implications, direct and systematic evidence of this practice remains scarce. This is due to a general lack of data on the prices used within a multinational and the prices for comparable arm's-length transactions. Thus, the question of transfer pricing practices in terms of their monetary value and the number of firms and countries involved remains largely unanswered.
We have built a unique data set that overcomes this problem. These data contain prices at the firm-productdestination level for both intrafirm and arm's-length exports. Having such detailed data is important for three key reasons. First, it allows us to control for other determinants of prices across firms, such as the relative productivity of multinationals as compared to exporters. Second, it allows us to control for the destination country's characteristics, such as income and trade costs, which are potentially correlated with tax variables yet affect intrafirm and arm's-length prices in different ways. Third, the richness of the data allows us to consider not only the effect of foreign corporate taxes on pricing behavior, but also the role of tax havens and how this behavior varies with firm and product characteristics.
We find no evidence of tax avoidance if we disregard tax haven destinations. Furthermore, transfer pricing is primarily found within large MNEs. These results are crucial for two reasons. First, they support the OECD's (2013) assertion that there is a difference between low-tax countries and tax havens that provide a tax environment that is particularly amenable to tax avoidance. Second, it shows that although transfer pricing may result in significant revenue losses, such losses are primarily due to a small number of firms. Given that our estimates are for 1999 alone, the cumulative tax losses from such transfer pricing should be quite large. This implies that by appropriately targeting enforcement, a significant increase in revenues may be achieved at a small cost. Moreover, since our data are only for manufacturing, and not services, this tax loss is likely to be the tip of the iceberg. This table investigates the impact of the effective tax rate, GDP per capita, distance, tariffs, GDPs, and the tax haven dummy on intrafirm and arm's-length export quantities. Robust standard errors clustered by destination in parentheses. Significance levels:
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